

MONOGRAPH

"THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHAPLAIN TEAM CONCEPT
and
ITS POTENTIAL USE IN AN INFANTRY DIVISION"

by

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INTRODUCTION

The "Situation-Time" factor developed by Chaplain (Major) Joseph Messing in his course "Power Concepts" portrays the United States in a new and uncomfortable role. The time is slightly more than half-past 1900. Already in this booming century we have fought two world wars, we have resisted the onslaught of Communism by uniting our arms with other nations, we have pioneered in a new age of atomics and electronics, and our present threatening situation finds us as one axis of a bi-polarity of world nations contesting free nations against international communism.

A strange new force has entered our world, the strangest and most enigmatic in all history. Equipped with a formula and a strategy, starting in one of the most backward countries of Europe, it has, in a brief forty years, taken control of one-third of the world's peoples and one-fourth of the world's territory. 1

Typically American, we have addressed ourselves toward the Russian Communist threat with attitudes ranging from the Churchillian "fight 'em now" to the naive bleat "let's not do anything, keep it peaceful, don't get excited for nothing". Fortunately, in spite of well-publicized efforts, they have not succeeded in undermining our Armed Forces. All branches of our military forces are pursuing research toward adequate preparedness for nuclear war. The Chaplain Branch of the United States Army is no exception!

Requirements of military preparedness demand equal capability in all dimensions of warfare. Adequate power must be established on land, sea, air and in the minds of men for any eventuality. In a day when armor thinks by the mile instead of the yard and all branches are thinking kilometer to expedite NATO commitments, it is definitely appropriate for Chaplains to study ways and means of preparing their "beefed-up battalion" of Soldiers for God to match the Bunyan strides of a modern Army.

The established principles of war will never become obsolete---they say! Something like the ancient Beatitudes for human behaviour, they require only slight modifications to fit present needs. So, too, it is with the other basic principles of men's faith and patriotism. Enlarged battle areas, phenomenal mobility and fire-power, space-age reconnaissance, and electronic devices WILL revise tactics. But, in all this, the US Army Chaplain was never more strategically important! Six foot pillars of God with iron wills are all the more needed in a day when mountains of masonry and steel may fall.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEAM CONCEPT

"FLEXIBILITY" and "MOBILITY" have become the two demanding demons of all tactical units. Supporting and

and special staff services are of necessity required to research procedures and equipment required in the performance of their missions. This paper will research the team concept of assignment and attachment of combat chaplains in a modern infantry division. The history of the team concept will be traced through recent use in Theater Army Logistical Exercises. Slight mention of its appropriate use in Field Army and Corps will appear as we carry the team idea quickly to the infantry division. Some consideration of the staff and equipment needed to complement the "teams" will be mentioned.

Before any new method or technique is applied to a basic tactical organization, it is tested thoroughly. Various branches of the military establishment have experimented with the team concept as an improved method for obtaining maximum utilization of technical and professional personnel. The medical and engineering branches have pioneered in this field. The present "packet" training and assignment of infantry soldiers is a modification of this concept. It has been proven that team effort improves efficiency in the individual soldier.

The Chaplain Branch of the United States Army began to experiment with the team concept during the 1958 Logistical Exercises at Fort Lee, Virginia. Under the heading "CHAPLAIN POLICY" the 1958 LOGEX HANDBOOK defines purpose and scope as follows:

This directive prescribes general procedures and policies governing the utilization of chaplain services in Theater Army. 2

Of particular interest in our study of team concept was the explanation of Chaplain Teams' purpose and types as employed in the Logistical Exercise:

- a. Purpose. Certain functional responsibilities will be accomplished by operational teams. These teams are Theater Army Units which may operate under centralized control, or be attached to subordinate commands. Teams will be used to:
- (1) Augment chaplain spaces to provide area religious coverage.
 - (2) Provide religious coverage in disaster areas.
 - (3) Operate religious retreat centers and conduct spiritual retreats.
 - (4) Operate chaplain supply distribution points.
- b. Types. Chaplain Teams will include the following provisional units:
- (1) Chaplain Team (Disaster)
 - (2) Chaplain Team (Area Coverage)
 - (3) Chaplain Team (Religious Retreat)
 - (4) Chaplain Team (Supply Distribution) 3

The assignment of Chaplain Teams to major commands requiring their services was delegated to the Commanding General, TALOG (Theater Army Logistical Command). The teams were to be considered strictly as emergency personnel. They were to be temporarily attached and NOT reassigned to fill TO&E vacancies. Command chaplains were expected to exercise operational control of all teams assigned or attached within their respective commands.

In the 1959 Logistical Exercise at Fort Lee, Virginia, six types of Chaplain Teams were played for the first time. They were given the following designations:

1. The Chaplain Area Coverage Team.
2. The Chaplain General Support Team.
3. The Chaplain Supply Distribution Team.
4. The Chaplain Religious Retreat Team.
5. The Chaplain Religious Affairs Team.
6. The Chaplain Administrative Team.

In the 1959 LOGEX a relatively new agency, RASC (Rear Area Security Controller), came into play. It was emphasized that "The chaplain will be required to work very closely with this staff section especially with reference to incidents of disaster. It is the policy of Theater Army that high priority be given chaplain coverage in disaster areas." 4 The largest team organized for play in LOGEX 1959 contained 3 Chaplains (1 Col, 1 LtCol, and 1 Maj), 1 Warrant Officer, and 4 Enlisted Men. This team was capable of administering the operations of 20 or more chaplains. The Religious Retreat Team was organized with a staff of 3 Chaplains (1 LtCol, 1 Maj, and 1 Capt), and 7 Enlisted Men. The smallest team consisted of 1 Chaplain and 2 Enlisted Men.

A review and analysis of the success of the team concept as played in Theater Army Logistical Exercises seems to indicate reserved approval in some areas and unqualified success in others (notably, Civil Affairs). It is definitely conceivable that an actual Theater Army engaged in modern and all-out warfare would DEMAND such teams for emergency service as well as their function in normal assignments.

THE MODERN INFANTRY DIVISION IN COMBAT


Each Corps Would Have an Emergency SOP for Chaplain Teams
to be used until Army or Theater Army Arrived

ARMY SOP FOR CHAPLAIN
TEAM EMERGENCY COVERAGE

ARMY SOP FOR CHAPLAIN
TEAM EMERGENCY COVERAGE

Theater Army Chaplain Teams

1. Area Coverage Team
2. General Support Team
3. Supply Distribution Team
4. Religious Retreat Team
5. Religious Affairs Team
6. Administrative Team



THE INFANTRY DIVISION

CHAPLAIN TEAMS IN FIELD ARMY AND CORPS

The Theater Army works with Field Armies and Field Armies function tactically through Corps employment of combat divisions. In the Logistical Exercises, the problems played anticipated the utilization of teams in the 10th Field Army and in Area Commands. The Corps was not played. The Teams that would function in expected Field Army or Corps emergencies would be the Area Coverage Team, the General Support Team, and the Administrative Team. It is anticipated that Army and Corps command chaplains would have SOPs adequately prepared for the temporary use of unit chaplains assigned within their commands for immediate use in cases of emergencies. Many emergencies might be adequately covered with such assigned personnel until replacements could be obtained. In major disasters, Theater Army Chaplain Teams would certainly be needed.

THE TEAM CONCEPT IN A MODERN INFANTRY DIVISION

The Infantry Division is one of the basic large units of the combined arms and services. It comprises a balanced force of essential arms and services organized and equipped to provide a lean, basic structure. The Infantry Division is self-sustaining and capable of effective operations either alone or as a part of a larger force. 5

The Infantry Division has a unique and vital role in a general atomic war. The strategic mobility of the division when supported by adequate air and/or sea lift will permit its movement alone or as a part of a larger force to the centers of enemy power. 6

The Infantry Division is the famed fighting unit of the US Army. The basic weapon is still the individual American fighting man! The ability to win and retain the basic earth upon which he walks and fights and dies is still the fundamental requirement of warfare. Armor is only a modern suit of mail for the Fighter, and a parachute is only an expedient means of delivery. Transportation now organic to an Infantry Division can only shuttle its troops short distances. Complete mobility can be attained with the attachment of five light truck companies. It is not a classified fact that the Infantry Division needs and will have additional mobility means. Because of the high efficiency, proven courage, and loyal esprit of the infantry soldier, most chaplains consider duty with such men choice assignments! No administrative or easy assignment can assuage the chaplain heart that bleeds for a close proximity with earth and men.

Eighteen chaplains and nineteen enlisted men comprise the Chaplain Staff of an Infantry Division. They are assigned in rank as follows:

<u>Division Hqs</u> <u>& Hqs Co</u>	<u>2 Chaplains</u> 1 LtCol 1 Maj	<u>3 Enlisted Men</u> 1 E-6 1 E-5 1-E-4
<u>Hqs & Hqs Det</u> <u>Div Trains</u>	<u>2 Chaplains</u> 1 Maj 1 Capt/Lt	<u>2 Enlisted Men</u> 1 E-5 1 E-4

<u>Hqs & Hqs Btry</u>	<u>2 Chaplains</u>	<u>2 Enlisted Men</u>
<u>Div Arty</u>	1 Maj	2 E-4
	1 Capt/Lt	

<u>Hqs & Hqs Co of</u>	<u>10 Chaplains</u>	<u>10 Enlisted Men</u>
<u>5 Battle Groups</u>	5 Majors	10 E-4s
	5 Captains/Lts	

<u>Hqs & Hqs Co</u>	<u>1 Chaplain</u>	<u>1 Enlisted Man</u>
<u>Div Armor Bn</u>	1 Capt/Lt	1 E-4

<u>Hqs Hqs & Svc Co</u>	<u>1 Chaplain</u>	<u>1 Enlisted Man</u>
<u>Div Engr Bn</u>	1 Capt/Lt	1 E-4

This complement of clergy and enlisted assistants provide the morale, welfare, character guidance training and religious coverage for approximately 14,500 men and officers.

The team concept for Infantry Division Chaplains has developed from the "area coverage" required by the ROCID (Re-organization Current Infantry Division) plan for employment of the Division. Area coverage was a technique devised as the best means for adequate coverage of the troops.

When applied, it means that the Chaplain assigned to units will provide proper chaplain coverage therein, and in addition, will provide chaplain coverage to other units adjacent or nearby which are otherwise without Chaplain coverage. 7

The Infantry Division Chaplain has frequently found this plan unsatisfactory to all concerned. Troops without chaplains were often neglected. Unit chaplains usually found themselves so occupied with the needs of their troops and the requirements of their commanders that they were not free to give the assistance desired by the Division Chaplain. Occasionally a unit-assigned chaplain has been penalized by an un-cooperative commander who jealously objected to sharing his chaplain's services. Under the present system of assignment,

with his unit executive officer rating and his commander endorsing his efficiency, the unit chaplain has been compelled to temper mercy with judgment. In all fairness it must be said that the selfish commander is the exception.

We have highlighted, however, a problem that will increase as our Battle Groups and Divisions range farther and faster in the insatiable quest of increased mobility and maneuver. The deadliest of reasons for such movement, dispersion and flexibility is the sobering and substantial CBR (chemical, bacteriological, radiological) capability of our self-styled enemies. We can expect the Battle Group size casualty in the next war as frequently as we lost a Company in War II or Korea. It would be disastrous (even criminal?) if the supporting and service and special staff elements of an Infantry Division would attempt to fight the next war with old techniques of control and replacement of personnel.

Serious studies of possible changes in assignment, attachment, control, and rating methods of chaplains have been initiated by the Chaplain Branch. The possible retention of all 18 Division chaplains in a headquarters "pool" has been considered. A more bold approach, and highly realistic, would be the extension of the "team concept" as developed in Theater Army experience. In this TOTAL team concept, all chaplains would remain permanently assigned to headquarters. They would be directly under the Division Commander and would remain under the technical control of the Division Chaplain. Through close liaison with his G-1 and G-3, the Division Chaplain could exercise immediate placement of his

chaplains by attachment where they were needed. He would have a well-defined responsibility to contribute largely in the efficiency ratings of his chaplains. Tactical teams of chaplains selected for physical and psychological abilities and thoroughly trained for participation in modern warfare would be more or less "permanently attached" to Battle Groups and Division Artillery. The chaplains at Division and Division Trains would by function be appropriately defined as administrative-tactical teams. The Division Trains team would by SOP be ready to replace either a Battle Group Team or the Division Team immediately in case of mass casualty. The Division Trains Team would function until relieved by replacements or by a Theater Army Team sent in for the period of the emergency. The Engineer and Armor Battalion chaplains might well be considered the most readily available replacements to augment any team where a single replacement was needed. Such a team concept as here presented would be most efficient in actual combat. It would require a highly trained and very capable Division Chaplain.

The advantages of such a completely controlled type of team concept would be:

1. Centralized technical control.
2. Improved technical supervision.
3. Capability for mass casualties.
4. More adequate coverage for all Division personnel.

5. Encouragement of professional integrity---less command-pleasing prima-donnas.
6. Simplified logistical problems.
7. Improved chaplain assignments---better denominational coverage.
8. Improved training and supervision of new chaplains.

The disadvantages of this total team concept were largely given the author by means of personal interviews with other chaplains and are as follows:

1. Lessened chaplain identification with his troops.
2. Increased professional and less personal service administered by chaplains.
3. Increased friction between chaplains due to such close technical supervision and control.
4. Lowered efficiency ratings due to command chaplain's influence.
5. Lessened unit loyalty and extreme professional loneliness.
6. Tangled logistical procedures.
7. Increased "peonage" of company grade chaplains.
8. Preferred line officer ratings to those influenced by senior chaplains.
9. Increased difficulty in obtaining qualified division chaplains capable of adequate supervision and technical control.

Although the total team concept has received serious consideration, there are many reasons for advancing a "modified" team concept. This modified team concept has been acceptable to some who fear the total team idea is too extreme. Both the "total" and "modified" concepts are limited to the planning stages of consideration. The modified concept is a bit difficult to precisely define, but the consensus of opinion seems

to be that the more strictly combat chaplains of the Battle Groups and Division Artillery would be permanently assigned to those tactical units. Thus, 12 chaplains would be assigned to these units and the remaining 6 chaplains would remain assigned to Division Headquarters. Two of these would be attached to Division Trains and one each to the the Engineer and Armor Battalions.

The advantages of this modified team concept would be:

1. Chaplain identification to tactical units.
2. Some restraint on Division Chaplain control.
3. Less centralized control in case of need for wide dispersion.
4. Less possibility of changes in chaplain assignments.

Some disadvantages offered in protest against the modified team concept are these:

1. Separation of chaplains into two types of control.
2. Reduced control and technical supervision in areas of greatest potential need in times of emergency.
3. Lessened "team" spirit of the total force of Division chaplains.
4. Reduced capability of chaplain coverage for all troops.

SUPPORTING STAFF AND EQUIPMENT

Before summarizing and concluding this paper with a very positive statement of personal conviction, it is appropriate to insert a brief paragraph on the subject of staff and equipment. Whichever way we may choose for more efficient assignment, attachment, and control of chaplain services in

an Infantry Division, there are some proposed adjustments, changes and improvements in staff and equipment that should be mentioned. For mere suggestion would be the following:

1. 7 Chaplain Assistants with special training in Radio Operation . (Minimum) 6 of these would be assigned to the Battle Groups and Division Artillery. The 7th would be assigned for duty with the Division Chaplain.
2. Radio-equipped, multi-purpose, self-sustaining vehicles for chaplains with tactical units.
3. Chaplain Kits to include survival foods and medicines.
4. Chaplain equipment to include wash-and-wear type vestments, stolls, and altar cloths.
5. Finger or battery operated record players for issue to isolated small units of men.
6. Serious consideration should be given to adjusting to specialized needs:
 - a. Definitive chaplain MOSs (military occupational specialty).
 - b. Obtaining 1 or 2 Helicopter or Fixed Wing Chaplain Pilots per Combat Division.
(Many chaplains have already had flying training.)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

"We hold a position of power that makes us morally accountable to mankind." 8 We, as chaplains, are the favored possessors of places of influence among men dedicated to the preservation of freedom. We dare not neglect or abuse any means for making our service most effective! "At the heart of our national policy must be the unqualified determination not to permit Communist world domination." 9

While we continually deepen our loyalty to God and to the ideals of Freedom, we must also persevere in efforts to defeat or deter our growing enemy. Toward this end, I recommend that we approve the TOTAL TEAM CONCEPT for immediate use in an Infantry Division Exercise. I believe the improved control to be a necessity in modern warfare. I predict that the chaplains most skeptical of the idea will be sold upon it when they see it in operation. We must be willing to sacrifice time-hallowed techniques to be READY. We cannot do more---AND WE DARE NOT DO LESS!

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